Trade Regulation--Monopolies--Status of Requirements Contracts under the Clayton Act by C., T. W.
Volume 52 Issue 1 Article 10 
December 1949 
Trade Regulation--Monopolies--Status of Requirements Contracts 
under the Clayton Act 
T. W. C. 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
T. W. C., Trade Regulation--Monopolies--Status of Requirements Contracts under the Clayton Act, 52 W. 
Va. L. Rev. (1949). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol52/iss1/10 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research 
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The 
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
dependable precedent elsewhere, the Supreme Court of Appeals
took the position that dealings with federal money would be
subject to the fiscal procedure and regulations required by local
statutes. Congress, by adopting the act creating the hot lunch
program, undoubtedly expected federal money to receive equal
protection with that of the state.
It has been held that federal funds appropriated by Congress
for vocational education and vested in the hands of the state
treasurer are public funds subject to laws governing handling and
the deposit of public funds, State ex rel. Griffith v. Thompson, 115
Kan. 457, 223 Pac. 258 (1924), unless the placing thereof in a
special fund is specifically authorized by the constitution or a
statute. State v. McMillan, 34 Nev. 264, 117 Pac. 506 (1911). In
such case, although the funds may not be subject to appropriation
by the legislature, not being part of the state's general fund and
the duty of the state treasurer in reference to them being merely
clerical and ministerial in nature, cf. Melgard v. Eagleson, 31 Idaho
41, 172 Pac. 655 (1918), state laws will still govern the handling and
deposit thereof. State ex rel. Griffith v. Thompson, supra (recogniz-
ing that the money did not necessarily belong to the state, but
could still be regarded as federal funds). Those authorities seem to
agree with our court's determination to protect federal funds. Fur-
ther, although the Kansas court was not faced in the Thompson
case with the issue of disbursement of federal funds through a state
agency, it seems probable that it would have protected them in dis-
tribution as it did in custody. By holding that our statutory regula-
tions apply to federal money spent under the auspices of the state
and not solely to money belonging to the state or its governmental
units, our court has made a further application of the same basic
policy. In view of increasing federal grants-in-aid to the states,
the decision would seem both proper and important.
R. F. T.
TRADE REGULATION-MONoPOLIES-STATUS OF REQUIREMENTS
CONTRACTS UNDER THE CLAYTON AcT.-Standard Oil had contracts
binding some 6,000 gasoline stations to purchase all their require-
ments of one or more of its products. Gasoline sales under those
contracts in 1947 totaled more than $57,000,000 which was, how-
ever, only 6.8% of the total gasoline sold to retail outlets in the
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competitive area. Sales by Standard's competitors had not decreased
after the adoption in 1934 of requirements contracts by Standard.
The United States sought an injunction on the ground that the
contracts violated §3 of the Clayton Act, 37 STAT. 731 (1914), 15
U. S. C. §14 (1946), that "It shall be unlawful for any person
engaged in commerce... to lease or make a sale or contract for
sale of goods.. on the condition, agreement, or understanding
that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the
goods of a competitor.. .where the effect may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce." Held, affirming the lower court, that requirements con-
tracts are unlawful under §3 if thereby "competition has been
foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected."
Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337 U. S. 293 (1949).
To establish a violation, it was essential that the facts should
be such as probably to result in a substantial lessening of competi-
tion for the word "may" in the qualifying clause had been inter-
preted in Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258
U. S. 346 (1922), to cover only probable consequences. The lower
court concluded that foreclosure from competition of some 6,000
outlets, considering the value of the sales involved, established
such probable consequences whether the sales were compared with
those of Standard Oil's competitors or not. United States v.
Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 76 F. Supp. 850, 889 (S. D. Calif. 1948).
Earlier authority involving §3 looked to the proportion of the
industry controlled by the challenged business to determine
whether the lessening of competition was substantial without pro-
posing that comparative domination was the only test. Oxford
V'arnish Corp. v. Ault & Wiborg Corp., 83 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1936).
Standard's sales through retail outlets, including its own stations,
comprised less than 14% of the total sales in the competitive area
and so less than half the percentage of the competitive field con-
trolled by the seller in Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston
Go., 258 U. S. 346 (1922), or in Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 312 U. S. 457 (1941), the only prior cases involv-
ing requirements contracts which the Supreme Court had declared
illegal under §3 of the Clayton Act. The Court in line with its
standard policy of self limitation in kindred cases, cf. Stauss, The
Supreme Court and the Architects of Economic Legislation, 56
J. POL. ECON. 138 (1948), accepted without endorsing the lower
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court's conclusion that the lessening of competition was substantial
in the instant case. The opinion does not purport to draw a line
between a remote and a substantial lessening of competition. That
is a matter of degree which must necessarily vary from industry to
industry in accordance with circumstances. The case is primarily
important because it authorizes refusal to receive or consider evi-
dence designed to rebut the inference raised by the foreclosure of
outlets.
With attention confined to the outlets foreclosed by the con-
tracts, the Court's conclusion that a substantial lessening of com-
petition was established as a probability cannot reasonably be con-
tested. In general, a lessening of competition may be anticipated
from a restraint placed on the normal influence of competitors.
Ct. Signode Steel Strapping Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 132 F.2d
48 (4th Cir. 1942); EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 176 (1949).
On the other hand, it may be supposed that restriction of a gasoline
station to one brand of gasoline will encourage the opening of
other stations selling competitive brands so that foreclosure of
existing outlets may increase the number of outlets and thereby
ultimately restore, or even increase, competition. Recent surveys
do indeed indicate that retail sales practices in the gasoline industry
have not given rise to the standard pattern of monopoly price
structures, Learned, Pricing of Gasoline: A Case Study, 26 HARV.
Bus. REv. 723 (1948); Rodgers and Luedicke, Dynamic Competi-
tion, 27 id. 237 (1949). However, monopoly power may conceiv-
ably manifest itself not by being projected forward on consumer
prices but by being reflected back in uneconomic returns to the
several factors of production. Cf. 2 BAIN, THE PACIFIC COAST
PETROLEM INDuSTRY 290 (1945); Macblup, Misconceptions About
the Current Inflation, 30 REv. or ECON. S STATISTICS 18 (1948).
The Court discreetly declined to examine all the evidence and
draw an independent conclusion as to the actual effect on competi-
tion. The bulk of the potential evidence and the still unsettled
state of economic thought as to the appropriate inferences from
such evidence surely made it the part of judicial wisdom for the
Court not to decide that competition was actually impaired by the
iequirements contracts but only to rule that it might not unreason-
ably be found to be threatened by them.
The correctness of the decision leaves unanswered, however,
the question whether the Court should have been called on to make
3
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it. As the Court points out in the instant case, there are other
methods, technically legal, that will accomplish the same ends for
Standard. It is by no means obvious whether it is preferable from
the standpoint of the nation's interests that Standard should use
requirements contracts, agency contracts or company-owned sta-
tions. To further those interests, it is important that the anti-trust
laws be enforced with due regard to the actual effect upon com-
merce as nearly as it can be ascertained. Many transactions tech-
nically illegal are in accordance with the spirit of the laws. See
Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV.
L. REV. 1289 (1948). In practice, few if any law enforcement
agencies have either the disposition or the resources to enforce the
laws in full in all situations coming within their purview and a
problem of selection consequently arises. The enforcement policy
of the Anti-Trust Division, as disclosed in this and other recent
cases, cf. United States v. New York Great A. & P. Tea Co., 173 F.2d
79 (2d Cir. 1948), suggests a diversion of the law to matters which,
though within its terms, are not clearly among the evils which
influential proponents of the Clayton Act seem to have had in mind,
cf. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 115 (1935), perhaps to the
neglect of practices it was designed to suppress. Located in the
Department of Justice, the Anti-Trust Division has naturally been
more sensitive to the impact of legal and political considerations
than to evolving economic thought and doctrines. See HAMILTON
AND TILL, ANI-TRUST IN ACTION 32 (1941). At best, prosecuting
agencies are not especially adapted to formulating a regulatory
policy. Cf. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 35 (1938).
In theory, the economic problems presented by situations of
this type could best be solved by a hearing before some such agency
as the Federal Trade Commission where such evidence as was
excluded by this decision could be examined and appraised. Un-
fortunately the Federal Trade Commission has been rebuffed so
often by the Court that it cannot be confidently relied on to attempt
or fo effectuate a positive program. See McAllister, Government
and Some Problems of the Market Place, 21 IowA L. Riv. 311
(1936). The situation has been remedied to some extent in recent
years but the Commission has not been effective in combating
monopoly. See Adelman, supra, at 1344.
The Anti-Trust Division won another victory in the instant
case, but Mr. Justice Douglas in dissenting points out that the
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merger of giant industries continues, while this decision only points
the way to further monopolization of the oil industry. The im-
plication is that the Anti-Trust Division might do greater service
to the cause of free competition by using its facilities in an adequate
prosecution of the mergers than by picking out technical viola-
tions of the anti-trust laws where the effect of the injunction can
be legally nullified. More fundamentally the doubt persists from
the course of recent prosecution policy whether the Anti-Trust
Division as presently constituted has demonstrated its fitness as the
agency for developing the program of combating monopoly and
preserving competition.
T. W. C.
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION-LEAVING EMPLOYMENT VOLUN-
TARILY WITHOUT CAUSE-"INVOLVING FAULT ON THE PART OF THE
EMPLOYER."-The claimant terminated her last employment be-
cause her physician advised that she might develop tuberculosis by
reason of the dust condition in her working place. She made no
allegation that her employer was at fault in connection with the
circumstances which caused her to cease work. Her claim for un-
employment benefits was denied by the Board of Review, whose
decision was appealed and affirmed by the circuit court. Held,
on appeal, that a person voluntarily leaving employment because
of fear of illness, or any cause not involving fault on the part of
the employer, is not entitled to unemployment benefits. State v. Hix,
54 S. E.2d 198 (W. Va. 1949).
Unemployment compensation provisions were first enacted in
West Virginia in 1936. W. Va. Acts 2d Ex. Sess. 1936, c. 1; cf. id.
S. Con. Res. 4. The purpose, as stated by the legislature is "to
provide reasonable and effective means for the promotion of social
and economic security by reducing as far as practicable the hazards
of employment. In the furtherance of this objective, the legisla-
ture establishes a compulsory system of unemployment reserves in
order to... (2) Guard against the menace to health, morals, and
welfare arising from unemployment." W. VA. CODE c. 21A, art. 1,
§1 (Michie, 1943). Under accepted practice in the construction
of statutes, cf. Sale v. Board of Education, 119 W. Va. 193, 192 S. E.
173 (1937); 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §5902 (3d ed.
1943); but cf. Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612 (1875), it is in the light
5
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